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[Editor's note: This article is part of a series on 
"Research Questions for the New Millenium." 
The series aims to identify research needed to 
inform employment policy in the near future.]
:onomic development organizations 
are acting smarter today, promoting "smart 
parks" (wired business parks), business 
accelerators, and conducting industrial clus 
ter analyses. Still, academic researchers 
generally believe that there is room for 
improvement, and they advocate even 
smarter economic development policies that 
can help alleviate poverty and promote 
regional productivity.
In particular, most researchers insist that 
smart economic development would avoid 
the blanket use of tax incentives and state 
grants to lure businesses across state lines. 
However, these programs remain the main 
stay to most economic development efforts. 
Critics of the economic development subsi 
dies offered by states argue that they may 
generate results that are worse than zero- 
sum, because limited public dollars are 
being used to promote non-market-based 
location decisions instead of providing pub 
lic goods. Practitioners argue that tax and 
finance incentives are crucial as states battle 
for that next plant opening.
Researchers agree that economic growth 
is better than no growth and that it is associ 
ated with improving conditions for econom 
ically disadvantaged persons. Madden
(2000), in her study of the nation's 198 
largest MSAs, found that economic 
growth regardless of whether it is in the 
core city or in the surrounding suburbs  
reduces metropolitan poverty; "[tjherefore, 
all policies designed to promote growth in 
jobs are antipoverty policies" (p. 162). 
Bartik (1991) found that economic growth 
has long-term positive effects on wage 
growth, career advancement, and unem 
ployment. However, researchers are 
quick to point out that the effects of eco 
nomic development programs depend 
upon how they are financed. If disadvan 
taged households are burdened by greater 
taxes or are negatively affected by cuts in 
public services, economic development 
could do more harm than good.
Advocates of smart economic develop 
ment believe that economic development 
organizations should look beyond economic 
incentives and toward the following issues.
Focusing Economic Development 
Incentives to Areas of High 
Unemployment
Bartik suggested that since the net differ 
ence between wage offers and the reserva 
tion wages of area workers tends to be larger 
in economically depressed areas, successful 
economic development efforts will generate 
greater economic benefits in these areas. 
Second, development in these areas would 
eliminate the spatial barriers in transporta-
ISSN 1075-8445
Employment Research SPRING 2001
tion and employment information flows 
faced by job-seeking residents.
Because companies only consider pri 
vate gains and not possible social gains of 
locating in brownfield or depressed areas, 
the social benefits generated by the devel 
opment of locally depressed areas would 
probably not exist without public policy 
intervention. Unfortunately, Fisher and 
Peters (1998, p. 212) found that most states 
do not have any clear incentives for firms to 
invest in places of high unemployment. 
This is changing, however; for example, the 
state of Michigan has introduced tax-free 
(excluding sales taxes) Renaissance Zones 
for economically depressed urban and rural 
areas. Moreover, as of 1995, 34 states 
operated state enterprise zone programs that 
offer tax and economic incentives for firms 
that invest in more than 2,800 economically 
distressed areas.
Enhancing Areas' Economic 
Competitiveness
Porter (1990) and other regional 
researchers have suggested that communi 
ties should focus their economic develop 
ment efforts on assisting their key industrial 
clusters in becoming global competitors. 
Porter argued that an area's economic suc 
cess depends on the quality of its resources 
and suppliers, a customer base which 
demands quality products or services, and 
intraregional firm rivalry.
Cluster analysis can be viewed as being 
part of a larger scope of research that exam 
ines the spatial factors of product develop 
ment and production. For many years, 
regional economists have explored the fac 
tors determining an area's place in its 
industries' product cycles. Some areas 
appear to be better incubators of 
products/services, while others are better 
production sites. Researchers and practi 
tioners alike are interested in promoting 
regional policies that encourage 
product/service development that would 
enable the area to keep and maintain the 
more creative edge of its core industries.
Entrepreneurship development is a key 
element of this spatial approach to econom 
ic development. Entrepreneurs can both 
generate the spark that could result in the 
area's next core cluster or (more likely) pro 
mote the cluster's longevity by generating
new products, new demand, or new suppli 
ers. Likewise, business technology assis 
tance programs, such as the manufacturing 
extension services, are efforts designed to 
improve an area's productivity. The role 
that universities and community colleges 
take in shaping the region's place in its 
industries' product cycles will surely get 
more attention in the coming years.
Conducting Solid Evaluations of Current 
Economic Development Efforts
State and local economic development 
efforts seldom spend the time or money nec 
essary to conduct reasonable evaluation 
studies of their programs, because poor 
results could jeopardize the effort. Yet, 
without such studies it is difficult for these 
organizations not to mismanage resources.
The barriers to conducting solid evaluation 
studies, however, are not limited to political 
intransigency alone. Classic evaluation 
studies require data that are seldom avail 
able. The inability to conduct a controlled 
experiment, for example, forces researchers 
to conduct historical studies using advanced 
econometric techniques to control for selec 
tion bias (a major problem in small business 
and manufacturing assistance programs), to 
rely on subjective survey opinion data, or to 
conduct cross-section regional studies where 
the "treated" community's performance is 
compared with that of similar communities. 
A recent development along this line is 
community benchmarking, in which a com 
munity measures its performance on key 
factors relative to similar communities (see 
Erickcek and Watts 2000).
Innovative Workforce Development Programs
The Cleveland Center for Employment Training (CET) is a nonprofit organi 
zation currently offering five specialized open-entry and open-exit training programs 
for occupations in high demand by local business. Local governments provide 94 
percent of the program's budget, and area firms play a key role in course design and 
instruction. Since 1967, the program has trained and placed 70,000 persons.
The Portland, Oregon, JobNet linked economically disadvantaged job seekers to 
job openings in firms receiving economic development assistance from the Portland 
Development Commission (PDC). To obtain financial assistance by the PDC, firms 
were required to sign a "First Source" agreement, requiring them to consider disad 
vantaged job applicants selected by the JobNet Program. These candidates were 
screened and trained for entry-level positions by various training organizations that 
were associated with the JobNet effort. From 1989 to 1996, JobNet placed, on aver 
age, 700 disadvantaged persons into jobs. Unfortunately, the program was eliminated 
due to the lack of strong local neighborhood support as the state consolidated training 
programs into one-stop centers.
The Minneapolis Neighborhood Employment Network (NET) is an activity of 
the mayor's office that works with 11 neighborhood affiliates to link economically 
disadvantages persons to private job openings. In short, the program depends on its 
job developers finding job openings, which are passed quickly to the neighborhood 
affiliates who recruit and screen potential job candidates.
The Milwaukee Career Cooperative is a nonprofit, temp-to-perm employment 
agency working in five inner-city neighborhoods in Milwaukee. A job developer 
works to find temporary job openings that can lead to permanent employment after 
no longer than a 90-day period. Candidates from the five neighborhoods, who are 
screened and provided job retention training, apply for the openings. The coopera 
tive receives a service fee from the employer as would a private employment agency. 
The fee accounts for approximately 75 percent of the program's costs; the remainder 
is covered by foundation and government sources. ,
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Integrating Workforce/Human 
Development Efforts with Local 
Economic Development Efforts
Local workforce development and eco 
nomic development efforts tend not to work 
together effectively, even though they are 
striving for the same goal of improving the 
employment and income opportunities of 
area residents. This is unfortunate because 
in a competitive, full-employment environ 
ment, firms may not be able to raise wages 
to attract workers and may be able to grow 
only through increasing the number of area 
residents who are ready to work. Business- 
directed, community-based training pro 
grams are now found on all levels. For 
example, the various Centers of 
Employment Training (CETs) sites across 
the country are neighborhood-focused train 
ing programs that concentrate on teaching 
key skills needed by neighboring firms. On 
the city level, the discontinued JobNet in 
Portland, Oregon, required businesses using 
city economic incentive programs to give 
disadvantaged individuals a fair chance in 
obtaining employment. On the state level, 
several states subsidize employee training 
through their community colleges.
As both academic researchers and prac 
titioners look for ways to act smarter, the 
following questions should be explored.
1) How can communities develop and 
maintain long-term job training 
programs that meet employers' 
needs and break employment barri 
ers for economically disadvantaged 
individuals?
2) What is the economic role of smaller 
metropolitan areas in the changing 
global environment, as product cycles 
shorten and industrial networks 
become international?
3) How can programs be better evaluat 
ed or, more importantly, how can 
future programs be better designed so 
that evaluations become a means to 
"adjust the course" and not to a threat 
to "pull the plug"?
Clearly, the worlds of practitioners and 
researchers are different. Researchers 
worry about employment displacement, 
cost-benefit ratios, and selection bias in
evaluation studies, whereas practitioners 
agonize about generating jobs. Still, both 
sides agree that an effective economic 
development program depends on commu 
nities' ability to link businesses, govern 
ments, and other stakeholders effectively, 
and that this effort will depend upon com 
munity leadership. This leads to the final 
major question to be addressed in the com 
ing years: how do we foster the necessary 
leadership to create and support active busi 
ness-education-government partnerships for 
effective local workforce/economic devel 
opment programs?
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George Erickcek is the senior regional 
analyst at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
Jean Kimmel, a senior economist at the 
Upjohn Institute, has accepted a position as 
associate professor in the Department of 
Economics at Western Michigan University, 
Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Kimmel has worked at the Institute 
since 1989. Before coming to the Institute, 
Kimmel worked for the University of 
North Carolina as a graduate student lec 
turer, teaching assistant, and research assis 
tant. She has also worked as a visiting 
assistant professor and an adjunct associate 
professor for Kalamazoo College and 
Western Michigan University, respectively. 
She received a B.A. degree at George 
Washington University, and she went on to 
receive an M.A. degree at the University of 
Delaware and a Ph.D. at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1990.
Since her arrival at the Institute twelve 
years ago, Kimmel has performed policy- 
relevant research in the areas of "moon 
lighting," welfare-to-work, employment- 
related child care issues, and health and 
employment behavior. She has written 
several working papers for the Institute, 
and her work has been published in 
Canadian Public Policy, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Labour 
Economics, The Journal of Monetary 
Research, and American Economic 
Review. She has also contributed to two 
books, both of which are expected to be 
published this year.
Kimmel has also lectured at numerous 
conferences. Most recently she spoke on 
"The Returns to Education and Basic Skills 
Training for Individuals with Poor Health 
or Disability" (co-authored with the 
Institute's Kevin Hollenbeck) at the Allied 
Social Sciences Associations annual meet 
ing. She is scheduled to give a presenta 
tion (co-authored with Lisa Powell) at a 
May conference titled "From Welfare to 
Child Care: What Happens to Infants and 
Toddlers When Single Mothers Exchange 
Welfare for Work?"
Kimmel will join the Department of 
Economics faculty at Western Michigan 
University in Fall 2001.
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F ne of the most important differ 
ences among state workers' compensation 
programs concerns the insurance arrange 
ments for providing workers' compensation 
coverage. State laws prescribe workers' 
compensation benefits, but these laws 
assign to employers the responsibility for 
providing benefits. The employers obtain 
workers' compensation coverage to provide 
these benefits by one of three mechanisms, 
depending upon the options available in 
their state. They may purchase insurance 
from 1) a private insurance carrier, 2) a 
competitive state workers' compensation 
fund, or 3) an exclusive (monopolistic) state 
workers' compensation fund. In addition, 
self-insurance is available in almost every 
state upon satisfying prescribed criteria. 
This commingling of private (insurance car 
rier) and public (state fund) approaches to 
providing workers' compensation benefits 
is a distinctive feature of workers' compen 
sation in the United States.
Another important difference is the 
degree to which workers' compensation 
insurance pricing has been deregulated. 
The private provision of workers' compen 
sation in the United States was highly regu 
lated until recently. Carriers were subject to 
"pure administered pricing," under which 
maximum permissible rates were largely 
determined by state rating bureaus, and the 
rates charged by carriers were subject to 
prior approval by state insurance commis 
sions. However, most states in recent years 
have dismantled (to varying degrees) their 
systems of regulation for workers' compen 
sation insurance pricing. In fact, the dereg-
ulatory movement begun by just a few 
states in the early 1980s has become so 
widespread that now only a few jurisdic 
tions continue to use the pure administered 
pricing approach.
In our recent book, Workers' 
Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety 
under Alternative Insurance 
Arrangements (2001, W.E. Upjohn 
Institute), we use a unique panel data set 
of state-level data for 48 jurisdictions 
between 1975 and 1995 to explore the 
effects of insurance arrangements on 
workplace safety, the structure of the 
workers' compensation insurance market, 
and the employers' cost of workers' com 
pensation insurance. In addition, we 
examine the trade-off between the benefit 
adequacy and affordability objectives of 
state workers' compensation programs 
and estimate the impact that the imposi 
tion of federal standards for benefit ade 
quacy would have on workers' compensa 
tion costs.
There is substantial debate about the rel 
ative merits of public versus private provi 
sion of workers' compensation insurance 
and about the regulation of private-carrier- 
provided workers' compensation insurance. 
This debate has, for the most part, centered 
on questions concerning the availability and 
affordability of compensation insurance, 
since these two variables are relatively easy 
to measure. However, questions have also 
been raised regarding the "quality" of serv 
ices provided to the parties to workers' 
compensation. Labor advocates, for exam 
ple, have been particularly concerned that 
the profit motive causes insurers to unjustly
deny claims or otherwise impede the deliv 
ery of benefits to workers, thus exacerbat 
ing the adverse consequences of workplace 
injuries or diseases.
Here, we focus on our results and con 
clusions with respect to only one of the 
research questions we addressed: the 
impact of the deregulation of the workers' 
compensation insurance market on employ 
ers' costs.
Deregulation and Employer Costs
Economic theory fails to offer unam 
biguous predictions about the impact of the 
regulation of rates in private insurance mar 
kets. In part this is because these effects 
depend on the behavior of the regulatory 
agency, which is driven by political rather 
than economic considerations. A regula 
tory body that aligns itself with employer- 
consumers of workers' compensation insur 
ance will suppress rates below competitive 
levels (at least in the short run). On the 
other hand, regulators who are more 
responsive to the insurance industry may 
help cartelize the market, resulting in supra- 
competitive rates. Even those regulatory 
agencies that pursue the public interest can 
inadvertently engender price distortions, 
due to lags in the rate-making process that 
delay the price response to changes in mar 
ket conditions.
Empirical study of property-casualty 
insurance (principally, automobile insur 
ance) has usually found that rates increased 
following deregulation, a result consistent 
with the hypothesis that regulators respond 
to consumer interests by suppressing insur 
ance prices. However, the results from 
those studies examining workers' compen 
sation insurance rates have been decidedly 
mixed. The empirical study of rates and 
deregulation is very difficult, and it is likely 
that no empirical study will ever surmount 
all of the problems and completely dispose 
of the issue once and for all. Nevertheless, 
we believe that we improve on previous 
research in at least two important ways.
First, while earlier studies typically used 
relatively simple measures of the regulatory 
environment (often, states were categorized 
solely as "regulated" or "deregulated" juris 
dictions), we use a more complex charac 
terization of the regulatory environment in 
order to capture the actual practices of the
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state regulatory agency as well as interstate 
differences in statutory regimes. We cate 
gorize state insurance market regulatory 
regimes as
  pure administered pricing, under 
which all insurers must use an identi 
cal set of manual rates that a) include 
an allowance for benefit payments 
("loss costs") as well as loadings for 
factors such as underwriting expenses, 
b) were developed by a rating bureau, 
and c) have been approved by the state 
regulatory agency;
  comprehensive deregulation, under 
which rating bureaus only publish loss 
costs and insurers are permitted to set 
their own rates without first seeking 
approval of state regulators; or
  three forms of partial deregulation, 
where at least one of the elements of 
the pure administered pricing system 
has been dismantled.
Second, because workers' compensation 
insurance rates vary among employers both 
within and among jurisdictions, it is diffi 
cult to measure the costs of workers' com 
pensation insurance actually paid by 
employers. Consequently, most previous 
research has relied on proxies such as the 
ratio of incurred losses to premiums writ 
ten. We use measures that accurately 
reflect the workers' compensation insurance 
costs actually paid by the average employer 
in a particular state during a particular year.
Figure 1 depicts summary statistics of 
rate estimates for 48 U.S. jurisdictions in 
the period 1975-1995, On average, the 
employers' cost of workers' compensation 
insurance rose markedly over the study 
period, from 0.95 percent of payroll in 
1975 to 2.97 percent in 1995. The cyclical 
nature of insurance pricing is also evident 
from the figure. Finally, the data reveal 
that interstate variation in adjusted manual 
rates increased considerably between 1985 
and 1990; thereafter, the variation generally 
declined.
Since workers' compensation insurance 
costs are affected by a variety of factors in 
addition to the regulatory environment, a





























































simple comparison of costs under different 
regulatory regimes is inappropriate. 
Consequently, we estimated multiple 
regression equations predicting employers' 
workers' compensation costs as a function 
of the regulatory regime variables as well as 
a variety of controls. These controls includ 
ed the levels of cash and medical benefits, 
the injury rate, and the proportion of the 
workforce covered by the state workers' 
compensation program, as well as state and 
year dummies to control for unobserved 
state- and time-invariant factors affecting 
employer costs. In addition, we also 
attempted to examine the interaction among 
the regulatory regime, the state of the insur 
ance market, and the behavior of the regula 
tory agency prior to deregulation.
Empirical Results
Most forms of partial deregulation are, 
on average, associated with higher employ 
er costs for workers' compensation. On the 
other hand, the most comprehensive form 
of deregulation loss cost systems that do 
not require prior approval is, on average, 
associated with lower employer costs. In 
addition, the impact of deregulation on 
costs depends not only on the statutory 
form of deregulation, but also on the behav 
ior of the regulatory agency prior to deregu 
lation; where the regulatory agency has 
suppressed rates, deregulation is more like 
ly to lead to increased costs. The behavior 
of the regulatory agency is apparently relat 
ed to the state of the insurance market; reg 
ulatory agencies are more likely to suppress 
rates during a hard market (when insurance 
demand exceeds supply and prices are 
increasing) than during a soft one. 
Consequently, the impact of deregulation 
varies over the insurance cycle.
What may we conclude from these 
results? Given the contradictory findings 
for partial and comprehensive deregulation, 
it is difficult to draw clear inferences con 
cerning the nature of regulation, i.e., 
whether regulatory agencies are more likely 
to respond to employers and suppress rates 
or whether they are more likely to help the 
insurance industry cartelize the market. 
Our inability to do so leads us to conclude 
that regulators do neither, at least not con 
sistently. Lags inherent in the regulatory 
process may be responsible for the incon 
sistent findings. However, it may also be 
due to the ebb and flow of political pres 
sures over the course of the insurance cycle. 
As the market hardens, political pressures 
from employers may force regulators to 
become more concerned with the impact of 
insurance rates on the state's business cli 
mate, and as a result, rates are suppressed. 
When the market softens once again, the 
political pressures ease and, concomitantly, 
regulators' concerns over the effect of
workers' compensation rates vanish and 
rates are allowed to rise to competitive 
(and, perhaps, supracompetitive) levels.
Insurers respond to this pattern of regu 
latory behavior by increasing prices during 
the soft phase of the insurance cycle, which 
is easier to accomplish where the market 
has been partially deregulated. Anticipating 
rate suppression when the market hardens 
again, insurers in partially deregulated sys 
tems are likely to keep market rates higher 
than the competitive level during the soft , 
phase of the cycle. In a partially deregulat 
ed environment, this is facilitated by the rat 
ing organization, which promulgates rates 
that serve as a pricing point for insurance 
carriers. This accounts for the asymmetry 
between comprehensive and partial deregu 
lation. Comprehensive deregulation results 
in lower prices during both phases of the 
insurance cycle, while insurers take advan 
tage of regulatory indifference to increase 
rates, during the soft phase, in anticipation 
of the coming crunch when the market 
hardens once again.
This interpretation of our results leads 
us to conclude that a completely deregulat 
ed market is a more efficient delivery sys 
tem and is, therefore, preferable to either 
partial deregulation or administered pricing. 
The latter two alternatives seem to be asso 
ciated with inefficiencies resulting from 
insurer uncertainty over their ability to 
respond to market changes. Furthermore, 
anecdotal evidence from states such as 
Rhode Island and Maine suggest that insur 
ance rate regulation can sometimes have 
near-catastrophic consequences for all of 
the stakeholders in the workers' compensa 
tion program.
Terry Thomason is director of the 
Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Labor Research 
Center at the University of Rhode Island. 
Timothy Schmidle is a senior research asso 
ciate at the Cornell University School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations. John 
Burton is a professor and former dean of 
the School of Management and Labor 
Relations at Rutgers University.
Business Outlook is the second of the two periodicals that the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
publishes quarterly, and it is now being made available on-line as part of the Upjohn 
Institute Web site. Under the direction of the Institute's senior regional analyst, George 
Erickcek, Business Outlook provides discussion and analysis of the economic condi 
tions and business developments in west Michigan.
Each issue contains a "Viewpoint" article on a topic of current interest, summaries of 
the national and regional economies, and statistics and discussion of the overall econo 
my in the state of Michigan. The remainder of the issue focuses on west Michigan, 
including sections on the three major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the region: 
Benton Harbor, Grand Rapids/Muskegon/Holland, and Kalamazoo/Battle Creek.
In addition to featuring the most recent quarterly statistics for the region, Business 
Outlook summarizes recent business activity such as mergers, plant expansions, and 
plant closings. An appendix provides detailed statistics for the west Michigan MSAs 
and selected national data.
Among the other features you will find on the Institute's Web site are seven Research 
Hubs, topic-specific pages on which we gather links to working papers, books, technical 
reports, and other information found on our site. If you're interested in Economic 
Development and Local Labor Markets, Disability and Workers' Compensation, 
Welfare-to-work, Unemployment Insurance, Work Arrangements, Workforce Quality: 
Education and Training, or Family Labor Issues, you'll want to bookmark these pages. 
Other features of our site include the full text of many Institute publications and reports, 
including staff working papers, articles from Employment Research, and the first chap 
ters of selected Institute books. Visit us at http://www.upjohninst.org.
Seeking Manuscripts
The Institute publishes books on subjects of importance to policymakers, 
labor economists, and practitioners who study labor market problems and pro 
grams to address them.
The majority of the books we publish originated from our Grant Program or 
for the Institute's in-house staff of professional economists. However, we also 
invite submissions of publishable book-length manuscripts and proposals for 
books from outside scholars and policy analysts. These submissions will be 
reviewed promptly by Institute staff, and manuscripts that appear promising will 
receive external anonymous peer review.
Send your manuscript or proposal to
j Dr. Kevin Hollenbeck
Director of Publications
W.E. Upjohn Institute
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
New Books from the Upjohn Institute
Pay at Risk
Compensation and Employment
Risk in the United States
and Canada
John A. Turner, editor
This book investigates whether 
employment and compensation risks 
for U.S. and Canadian workers have 
increased. The
I»,.'IW< -am authors examine 
both wage and 
nonwage aspects 
of compensation, 
and whether work 
ers in either coun 
try face more job-
j|fi; "ato related risks. They 
. also seek to identi 
fy trends in risk bearing and whether 
they differ by country. Included are
  Wage and Job Risk for Workers, 
John A. Turner
  Risk in Employment Arrangements, 
Sophie M. Korczyk
  Health and Coverage at Risk, Robert 
B. Friedland, Laura Summer, Sophie 
M. Korczyk, and Douglas E. Hyatt
  Risk Sharing through Social Security 
Retirement Income Systems, John A. 
Turner
  Risk Bearing in Individual and 
Occupational Pension Plans, James E. 
Pesando and John A. Turner
  Risk Shifting in Workers' 
Compensation, Douglas E. Hyatt
215 pp. $36 cloth ISBN 0-88099-222-0 





Kirsten S. Wever, editor
How and why nations adopt sys 
temic change reveals much about their 
underlying economic, societal, and 
governmental 
bases. Such les 
sons are evident in 
this new volume 
that explores how 




Germany and the 
United States  embraced change in 
four contemporary settings: telecom 
munications deregulation and privatiza 
tion, management development sys 
tems, supplier relations, and employ 
ment relations.
The individual chapters explore the 
tradeoffs necessitated by each country's 
institutions and include comparisons of 
sectoral and firm-level adjustment 
processes for change. Included are
  Mutual Learning with Trade-offs, 
Kirsten W. Wever
  Deregulation and Restructuring in 
Telecommunications Services in the 
United States and Germany, 
Rosemary Batt and Owen Darby shire
  Institutional Effects on Skill Creation 
and Management Development in the 
United States and Germany, David 
Finegold and Brent Keltner
  National Institutional Frameworks 
and Innovative Industrial 
Organization, Steven Casper
  Perils of the High and Low Roads, 
Lowell Turner, Kirsten S. Wever, and 
Michael Fichter
170 pp. $35 cloth ISBN 0-88099-216-6 
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-215-8 / 2001.
Workers' 
Compensation
Benefits, Costs, and Safety
under Alternative 
Insurance Arrangements
Terry Thomason, Timothy P. Schmidle, 
and John F, Burton, Jr.
Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 
make use of a unique data set to delve 
into how insurance arrangements affect 




effects of deregula 
tion and other 




cal analyses that 
use state-specific cost, benefit, and 
injury data from 48 states for 
1975^1995.
This allows them to address the 
interactive relationships among the 
objectives of WC systems and how var 
ious public policies adopted by states 
or the federal government work to 
achieve them.
Several important contributions 
result. For instance, the authors quanti 
fy the trade-offs between adequacy and 
affordability that would result from a 
federal mandate requiring adequate 
benefits. They also provide analysis of 
the possible trade-offs in using differ 
ent public policies regarding insurance 
arrangements, e.g., the expected sav 
ings to employers from deregulation of 
private insurance carriers. Overall the 
authors' results clarify the complicated 
relationships between insurance 
arrangements and employers' costs, and 
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